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ABSTRACT
The objective of the present paper is to review the literature on the link between
environmental policy and international trade, with a focus on imperfect competi-
tion on the world output markets. Special attention will be paid to the literature
on oligopoly and strategic government policy and its potential consequences for
the ecological dumping debate. We address partial equilibrium as well as general
equilibrium approaches, and emphasize the fact that opposing conclusions can be
reached.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The pollution haven hypothesis is deﬁned by Taylor (2004, p. 1) as a prediction that
“liberalized trade in goods will lead to the relocation of pollution intensive production
from high income and stringent environmental regulation countries, to low income
and lax environmental regulation countries.” The pollution haven hypothesis was ﬁrst
envisaged by Copeland and Taylor (1994). This seminal piece of work was followed by
a large number of other important contributions by the same authors and culminated in
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their recent book (Copeland and Taylor 2003). A recent issue of Advances in Economic
Analysis and Policy and Contribution to Economic Analysis and Policy (2004) was entirely
devoted to the pollution haven hypothesis (see Fullerton 2006), including an excellent
surveybyTaylor (2004).Therefore, there appears to benotmuch room for another survey
on the topic. However, most of the literature on the pollution haven hypothesis is aiming
at empirical applications1 and relatively minor attention is paid to the economic theory
behind the hypothesis. Moreover, most of the existing theory focuses on conditions
of perfect competition. It seems therefore worthwhile to pay attention to imperfect
competition, thereby relating the pollution haven hypothesis to the existing theory of
strategic trade policy and the environment. The latter topic was addressed earlier by
Ulph (1997), but the present article aims to incorporate some more recent developments.
In the Copeland-Taylor approach a distinction can be made between exogenous and
endogenous environmental policy. In the former case environmental policy is imple-
mented independently of preferences or endowments, whereas in the latter environmen-
tal policy is aiming at maximizing social welfare. In our treatment of international trade
and environmental policy, we will always concentrate on the latter type of policies. We
will treat the Copeland-Taylor model in Section 2 of this article. We aim at a formal
treatment, as in the rest of this article, because such an approach allows for a precise
statement of the results and illustrates the exact role of the assumptions made.
Starting in Section 3, we review the existing literature on trade and the environmen-
tal in a non-competitive setting. This review is brief because it partly overlaps with
Ulph’s (1997) earlier excellent contribution. In Section 3, we also present a rather general
model, in a partial as well as in a general equilibrium setting, that serves as the vehicle
for in the remainder of the paper. We also explore the case of perfect competition and
the large country case. Section 4 goes into oligopoly, and in particular treats the issue
of strategic environmental policy. Thereby a distinction is made between Cournot and
Bertrand competition. In this section, the partial equilibrium outcomes are derived and
are related to the existing literature that already incorporates most of them. Section 5
discusses oligopoly and strategic environmental policy in general equilibrium models. It
shows that the outcomes of the partial equilibrium models regarding optimal environ-
mental policy may be reversed. Finally, Section 6, concludes.
Unfortunately, space restricts the topics that can be addressed. Hence, we do not go
into the important issue of technology transfers that might counterbalance the pollution
haven effect. As Di Maria and Smulders (2004) observe, if richer countries specialize in
the production of clean commodities they might also direct R&D efforts to cleaner tech-
nology that might diffuse to other countries. Also Golombek and Hoel (2004) address
technology transfer. Another important aspect of international trade and the environ-
ment is the property rights differential that might exist between developed and less
developed countries and that might lead to overexploitation of natural resources and
consequently welfare losses. The seminal papers here are by Chichilnisky (1993 and
1994). More recent contributions are by Brander and Taylor (1997) and Karp et al.
(2001). Finally, we will not go into location choices as a consequence of environmental
1 A list of references to the empirical literature is given at the end of the paper.
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policy. It will be assumed throughout that all policy effects are materialized only in trade
patterns and not in a change of location of plants or of persons. For the literature on
location aspect of ﬁrms see e.g., Markusen et al. (1993 and 1995), Motta and Thisse
(1994) and Hoel (1997). Elbers and Withagen (2004), Haavio (2003a and 2003b) and
Hoel and Shapiro (2003) study location choices of workers.
Finally, before embarking on the survey, a note on notation. Although we will review
numerous contributions we aim at providing a uniformpresentation in terms of notation.
The symbols W ,U ,D,F, c, p, z, τ will denote social welfare, utility from consumption,
environmental damage, production function, consumption, price, pollution and emission
taxes, respectively. Subscripts refer to different commodities and superscripts to ﬁrms.
The distinction between home and foreign is usually indicated by superscript h and f .
2 THE COPELAND-TAYLORMODEL
An extremely inﬂuential model is the Copeland-Taylor model, described in a number of
publications by these authors and recently comprehensively treated in their 2003 book,
fromwhichwe borrow extensively in this section. Our aim is to sketch how trade patterns
depend on environmental policy in a competitive world.
By way of introduction for the reader unfamiliar with the trade environmental policy
link, we ﬁrst summarize what can be called the textbook approach, followed e.g., in
Perman et al. (2003) or Pearson (2000). The simplest setting is a two country–two goods
world in a partial equilibrium framework. The usual strategy is to derive the autarky
equilibrium allocation and prices and to show that, in the absence of environmental
externalities, opening up to free trade at given world market prices is beneﬁcial from a
welfare perspective. However, if production brings along local pollution and environ-
mental policy is absent, the country exporting the dirty commodity may suffer a welfare
loss because of the increased negative externality from pollution following increased
production. But then it is shown that an optimal Pigouvian tax on pollution will restore
the result that free trade increases welfare in both countries engaged in trade. The case of
transboundary pollution is somewhat more complicated to analyze, because that would
require coordinated policy. In the sequel we shall not address this issue.
Copeland and Taylor (2003) construct a general equilibrium two country (North and
South), two goods, two factors model, in order to identify which of the two countries is
going to be the exporter of the dirty commodity. Two hypotheses are investigated: the
pollution haven hypothesis and the factor endowment hypothesis, both deﬁned in the
Introduction of this article.
The factors of production are labeled capital and labor; they are immobile across
the two countries but mobile between sectors. Their initial endowments are k and l,
respectively. The production function of the ﬁrst commodity is y1 = zα[F1(k1, l1)]1−α
with 0 < α < 1 and F1 linearly homogeneous in capital and labor input. Emissions
z can be interpreted as arising from the use of a production factor such as energy. An
alternative interpretation includes abatement. Without abatement emissions would be
proportional to output, with factor of proportionality equal to unity. Abatement requires
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labor and capital, in the same proportion as in the “normal” production process. This is
modeled as y1 = (1 − ϑ)F1(k1, l1), z = (1 − ϑ)1/αF1(k1, l1), where ϑ is the abatement
level, varying between 0 and 1. Output is used for consumption (c1) and net exports (x1).
The second commodity is clean. Domestic consumption is c2 and net exports are x2.
The given world market price is p. Production of the dirty commodity is always more
capital intensive than the clean commodity: (k1/l1) > (k2/l2). The instantaneous utility
function U depends on consumption and is homothetic. Damage D is increasing and
convex in emissions. The aim of the government is to maximize social welfare
W (c1, c2, z) = U (c1, c2) − D(z),
subject to
c1 + x1 = zα[F1(k1, l1)]1−α, (1)
c2 + x2 = F2(k2, l2), (2)
px1 + x2 = 0, (3)
k = k1 + k2, (4)
l = l1 + l2. (5)
Equation (3) deﬁnes the equilibrium on the current account of the balance of trade, with
the second commodity as the numeraire. The Lagrangian reads
L = U (c1, c2) − D(z) + µ1[zα[F1(k1, l1)]1−α − c1 − x1] + µ2[F2(k2, l2) − c2 − x2]
+ ν[ px1 + x2] + r¯[k − k1 − k2] + w¯[l − l1 − l2].
Necessary conditions for an interior solution are:
∂U
∂c1
= µ1, ∂U
∂c2
= µ2, (6)
D′(z) = µ1αzα−1[F1(k1, l1)]1−α, (7)
µ1(1 − α)zαF−α1
∂F1
∂k1
= r¯, µ1(1 − α)zαF−α1
∂F1
∂l1
= w¯, (8)
µ2
∂F2
∂k2
= r¯, µ2 ∂F2
∂l2
= w¯, (9)
µ1 = νp, µ2 = ν. (10)
Denote the optimal value of the variables and the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers
by hats. Deﬁne
r = ˆ¯r
µˆ2
, w = ˆ¯w
µˆ2
, τ = D
′(zˆ)
µˆ2
.
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Then,
(i) (cˆ1, cˆ2) maximizes U (c1, c2) subject to
pc1 + c2 ≤ rk + wl + τzˆ = rk + wl + [ pzˆα[F1(kˆ1, lˆ1)]1−α − rkˆ1 − wlˆ1 − τzˆ]
+ [F2(kˆ2, lˆ2) − rkˆ2 − wlˆ2] + τzˆ = pzˆα[F1(kˆ1, lˆ1)]1−α + F2(kˆ2, lˆ2).
(ii) (zˆ, kˆ1, lˆ1) maximizes pzα[F1(k1, l1)]1−α − rk1 − wl1 − τz.
(iii) (kˆ2, lˆ2) maximizes F2(k2, l2) − rk2 − wl2.
So, consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, producers maximize
proﬁts, given the rate of return r, the wage rate w and the tax on emissions τ, which is
set equal to marginal damage, in money terms. Therefore, (cˆ1, cˆ2, kˆ1, kˆ2, lˆ1, lˆ2, zˆ, q, r,w)
constitutes a general competitive equilibrium. Hence by an appropriate choice of the
pollution tax the ﬁrst-best optimum can be implemented as a general equilibrium.
It is important to realize that this is due to the fact that the world is perfectly
competitive.
Due to the fact that the utility function U is homothetic, relative demand RD( p) =
c1/c2 is a function of p only. It is decreasing. For a given z, national income
pzα[F1(k1, l1)]1−α + F2(k2, l2) is maximized in a general equilibrium, subject to (4) and
(5). Hence, we can write y1 = y1(k, l, e, z) and y2 = y2(k, l, e, z), where e = x/y1 is the
pollution intensity in the polluting sector. Due to constant returns to scale these func-
tions are linearly homogeneous in (k, l). Therefore, relative supply is RS( p, e, k/l) =
y1( p, e, k/l)/y2( p, e, k/l). It can be shown that under the assumptions made, relative
supply is increasing in the price as well as in the capital labor ratio (the latter because the
dirty sector is more capital intensive).
Now, consider ﬁrst the case where North is relatively rich, but with the same relative
factor endowment as South. If environmental policies would be such that the pollution
intensities are identical, the equilibrium autarky price p would be identical, and there
would be no reason for trade. However, with higher national income, social welfare
maximization requires a more stringent environmental policy. Therefore the pollution
intensity will be lower in the North than in the South, implying that the autarky price
in North will be higher. This implies that when the countries open up to trade, North
is going to import the dirty commodity and South is going to produce more of the
dirty commodity, thereby causing more pollution as well. This is the pollution haven
hypothesis. However, if environmental policy is set optimally in both countries, both
countrieswill beneﬁt from trade.Whetherworldpollution increases or decreases depends
on the so-called income elasticity of marginal damage. As a consequence of trade income
increases, which may call for a strong or a weak policy response, represented by the
elasticity. If the required policy response is weak, total pollution may increase, otherwise
it will increase.
A second experiment is to change the relative endowments. If the North is relatively
capital abundant, then with identical emission intensities the North, whose produc-
tion of the polluting commodity is relatively capital intensive, will export the dirty
commodity.
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These considerations clearly demonstrate the issues at stake.Differences in the relative
abundance of capital enhance the factor endowment hypothesis: North will specialize
in the production of the dirty commodity. Being rich, while relative endowments are
identical, supports the pollution haven hypothesis through the policy effect.
3 IMPERFECT COMPETITION; AN INTRODUCTION
3.1 Introduction
Ideally, the Copeland-Taylor model of the previous section is extended so as to incor-
porate imperfect competition in a full-ﬂedged general equilibrium model, to investigate
the impact of strategic behavior of governments. However, to the best of our knowledge
no literature on this topic has developed yet. Therefore, our objectives in the sequel of
this survey are relatively modest. The aim of the present section is threefold. We ﬁrst
introduce a model that is employed in the sequel of this article. It is designed to address
the main question posed in this literature, namely whether strategic considerations may
lead governments to treat different sectors in the economy differently. In particular, a
distinction will be made between the sheltered and the exposed sectors of the economy.
The exposed sectors export their commodities, whereas the sheltered sectors do not.
This allows us to analyze the question whether from a social welfare point of view it
could be optimal to protect the exposed sectors, in the sense of making them subject
to less stringent environmental policy. The second objective is to characterize the social
optimum for the case of perfect competition and the “large country” case. Third, we
deal with the implementation of the ﬁrst-best in a decentralized economy.
3.2 The Model
The main ingredients of the model we employ are borrowed from the model constructed
by Rauscher (1994) in his article on general equilibrium and environmental policy. We
do not take into account abatement because for most of the results this is not essential.
There are ﬁve commodities: three consumer commodities, capital and a raw material.
The ﬁrst consumer commodity is produced and consumed domestically only. Produc-
tion takes place in the so-called sheltered sector. This sector is composed of many ﬁrms
that behave competitively. Aggregate technology is described by a production function
(F1), having capital (k1) and the raw material (z1) as inputs. Consumption is denoted by
c1. The second class of consumer commodities is produced domestically in n(≥ 1) sec-
tors, indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Part of the output of sector i is consumed domestically
(ci2), part of it is exported (x
i
2). These sectors are called exposed. Each individual sector
can consist of differently behaving ﬁrms but producing a homogeneous commodity. We
allow for the case that the exposed sector consists of small number of ﬁrms (including
a single ﬁrm) and of a large number of ﬁrms. Another distinction made is between the
country being “large” or “small” on the market of an exported commodity. All individ-
ual ﬁrms producing a variety for which the economy is small, can be aggregated and
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described as a representative competitive ﬁrm. Some of the “large” sectors each may
contain a continuum of competitive ﬁrms, which we aggregate into a representative ﬁrm
as well. Each of the other “large” sectors consists of a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms exploiting
their market power. The different market structures to be discussed all differ in the
speciﬁcation and composition of the exposed sector. Hence, for each case the details of
the sector receive due attention. For sector i the technology is described by Fi2, with
as inputs capital (ki2) and a raw material (z
i
2). The third consumer commodity can-
not be produced domestically; it needs to be imported. Consumption is denoted by c3.
The third commodity is taken as the numéraire. Capital is immobile internationally but
mobile between domestic sectors. Some empirical as well as theoretical support for the
assumption of international immobility of capital can be found inGordon andBovenberg
(1996). The economy’s endowment is given by k. The rate of return on capital is denoted
by r.
The raw material is in principle freely available in unlimited amounts. However, pro-
cessing of the raw material causes pollution, proportional to production, with factor of
proportionality equal to unity. Contrary to Copeland and Taylor (2003) both sectors
are polluting. Pollution is damaging. The government therefore levies taxes τ1 and τ i2
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) per unit of raw material used in the sheltered and the exposed sectors,
respectively. The taxes can be differentiated between as well as within sectors. The tax
revenues are recycled to the consumers in a lump sum fashion. Alternatively, the gov-
ernment imposes emission ceilings, that might or might not be implemented through a
system of tradable permits.
The income of the representative consumer consists of the value of the capital endow-
ment rk, the tax revenues τ1z1 +∑ni=1 τ i2zi2, and the proﬁts of the ﬁrms, which amount
to p1F1(k1, z1) − rk1 − τ1z1 and ∑ni=1{ pi2Fi2(ki2, zi2) − rki2 − τ i2zi2} for the sheltered
and the exposed sectors, respectively, assuming for the moment that the domestic price
of the second commodity equals its world market price. Under the assumption of full
employment of capital (in a situation where ﬁrms maximize proﬁts) total income boils
down to (in shorthand) p1F1 +∑ni=1 pi2Fi2.
The consumer maximizes utility, taking prices and income given. Preferences consist
of two parts. First, they depend on the consumption of the consumer goods. This is
represented by a utility function, denoted by U (c1, c2, c3), where c2 = (c12, c22, . . . , cn2).
The utility function is assumed to have all the usually desired properties such as con-
cavity, differentiability and monotonicity. Second, consumers experience damage from
pollution. With a little abuse of notation, this part of the preferences is given by the
(convex and increasing) damage function
D(z1, z2) = D
(
z1 +
n∑
i=1
zi2
)
, with z2 = (z12, z22, . . . , zn2).
So, it is assumed that pollution is only local. Total social welfare is
W (c1, c2, c3, z1, z2) = U (c1, c2, c3) − D(z1, z2).
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Finally, we impose equilibrium on the current account of the balance of payments.
Summarizing:
c1 = F1(k1, z1), (11)
ci2 =
n∑
i=1
[Fi2(ki2, zi2) − xi2], i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (12)
c3 =
n∑
i=1
pi2x
i
2, (13)
k1 +
n∑
i=1
ki2 = k. (14)
Demand for the exported commodity is still to be speciﬁed. It depends on the market
structure under consideration.
In the sequel we will occasionally employ speciﬁc functional forms to illustrate the
results and to perform numerical exercises. In those exercises utility is logarithmically
additive, environmental damage is quadratic, production functions are Cobb–Douglas.
U (c1, c2, c3) = ln c1 + ln c2 + ln c3, (15)
F1(k1, z1) = kα1z1−α1 , (16)
Fi2(k
i
2, z
i
2) = (ki2)β(zi2)1−β, (17)
D(z1, z2) = 1/2
[
z1 +
n∑
i=1
zi2
]2
. (18)
3.3 First-Best; Perfect Competition and the Large Country Case
In this section, we characterize the social optimum for the case of perfect competition as
well as for the case of a large country. With perfect competition each of the producers in
the exposed sector takes the world market price as given. The world market price is also
equal to the domestic price. The large country case can be modeled in several ways. One
can maintain the assumption of a continuum of price taking producers in an exposed
sector but in addition assume that the government can exploit the fact that the country
as a whole is a large player on the world market. Alternatively, it can be assumed that
there is a single exporting ﬁrm of the commodity for which the country is large, that
exploits its monopoly power itself. We go into both alternative settings.
The ﬁrst-best optimum is deﬁned as the allocation that maximizes social welfare,
i.e., utility of the representative agent minus the disutility of pollution damage, subject
to the restrictions imposed by the technology and the condition of equilibrium on the
current account of the balance of payments. In mathematical terms it is the solution of
International Trade and Environmental Policy Under Imperfect Competition 159
the maximization of
W (c1, c2, c3, z1, z2) = U (c1, c2, c3) − D
(
z1 +
n∑
i=1
zi2
)
,
subject to (11)–(14). The Lagrangian of the problem reads:
L = U (c1, c2, c3) − D
(
z1 +
n∑
i=1
zi2
)
+ µ1[F1(k1, z1) − c1]
+
n∑
i=1
µi2[Fi2(ki2, zi2) − xi2( pi2) − ci2]
+µ3
[ n∑
i=1
pi2x
i
2( p
i
2) − c3
]
+ r¯
[
k − k1 −
n∑
i=1
ki2
]
,
where xi2( p
i
2) denotes world demand for variety i.
Assuming an interior solution we ﬁnd as necessary conditions
∂U
∂c1
= µ1; ∂U
∂ci2
= µi2, i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
∂U
∂c3
= µ3, (19)
µ1
∂F1
∂k1
= r¯; µ1 ∂F1
∂z1
= D′, (20)
µi2
∂Fi2
∂ki2
= r¯; µi2
∂Fi2
∂zi2
= D′, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (21)
−µi2
dxi2
dpi2
+ µ3
[
xi2( p
i
2) + pi2
dxi2
dpi2
]
= 0, (22)
where primes refer to derivatives. In the sequel hats denote the solution of this problem:
(cˆ1, cˆ2, cˆ3, pˆ2, kˆ1, kˆ2, zˆ1, zˆ2, xˆ2), where k2 = (k12, k22, . . . , kn2), z2 = (z12, z22, . . . , zn2), x2 =
(x12, x
2
2, . . . , x
n
2) and p2 = ( p12, p22, . . . , pn2).
The interpretation of the necessary conditions is straightforward. With µ1 the
marginal value (in utility terms) of one unit of output of the sheltered sector, the second
part of (20) says that the marginal value of a pollution input in this sector should equal
marginal damage (disutility of pollution). This also holds for the exposed sectors, with
µi2 interpreted as the marginal value of a unit of variety i. Equation (22) says that an
increase of the world market price of variety i causes lower demand, so that more output
can be used for domestic consumption, which is beneﬁcial. But the export revenues
decrease, implying less income available for the import of the third commodity.
The next step is to investigate how the ﬁrst-best optimum can be realized in a decen-
tralized setting. Many results regarding the implementation of the ﬁrst-best optimum
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in a decentralized economy are straightforward modiﬁcations of earlier work by, for
instance, Hoel (1996) and Rauscher (1997), and they have become standard inferences
in the theory of international trade (see e.g., Dixit 1985). Nevertheless, we state them
explicitly here for later reference. Deﬁne
ti = − 1
εˆi2
, p1 = µˆ1
µˆ3
, qi2 =
µˆi2
µˆ3
= pi2(1 − ti), (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), p3 = 1,
τ = τ1 = τ i2 =
D′(zˆ)
µˆ3
, (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), r = ˆ¯r
µˆ3
with εˆi2 is the price elasticity of world market demand for the second commodity which,
evaluated at the optimum(smaller thanminusunity). So, qi2 is the value inmonetary terms
of variety i. Due to the concavity/convexity assumptions on the functions involved the
necessary conditions corresponding with the ﬁrst-best social optimum are also sufﬁcient.
Observe the following:
– The pair (kˆ1, zˆ1) maximizes proﬁts p1F1(k1, z1) − rk1 − τz1 of (aggregate) ﬁrm 1.
This is the case because in the ﬁrst-best the pair maximizes
µˆ3
[
µˆ1
µˆ3
F1(k1, z1) −
ˆ¯r
µˆ3
k1 − D
′(z)
µˆ3
z1
]
.
– For the same reason (kˆi2, zˆ
i
2) maximizes proﬁts q
i
2F
i
2(k
i
2, z
i
2)− rki2 − τzi2 of (aggregate)
ﬁrm i of the exporting sector.
– The triple (cˆ1, cˆ2, cˆ3) maximizes U (c1, c2, c3) subject to
p1c1 +
n∑
i=1
qi2c
i
2 + p3c3 = p1F1 +
n∑
i=1
qi2F
i
2 + T ,
where T denotes recycled export tariff revenues.
– The world market pi2 maximizes ( p
i
2 − qi2)xi2( pi2): export revenues minus the oppor-
tunity costs of consumption of the exported commodity foregone.
– Finally, all markets clear at the proposed prices.
Hence, we can state the following:
The ﬁrst-best optimum can be implemented in a decentralized economy by:
(i) Imposing a uniform emission tax.
(ii) Imposing export taxes on the ﬁrms in sectors where the economy is “large” but where the
individual ﬁrms do not exploit this.
(iii) Correcting non-environmental domestic distortions.
This result about implementation is well known from the general theory of international
trade (see alsoNeary 2006). It implies that in the case of perfect competition on the world
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market for the exported commodity, it is optimal not to impose an import tariff (ti = 0
if εˆi = −∞) and to tax emissions according to their marginal damage. Hence, with a
uniform Pigouvian emission tax the social optimum can be reached in a trading economy.
The situation is different when the country is “large”, so that world demand depends on
the price set by the country (assuming for the moment there is no perceived interaction
with other foreign players). If, as is commonly assumed in the literature, each individual
domestic ﬁrm is small on the world market, but that the sector producing the exported
commodity, is large on aggregate, then it is optimal to impose an export tax, but still tax
emissions according to marginal damage, which is equal for all ﬁrms. Finally, if ﬁrms are
large and act as such on the world market, there is clearly no need for an export levy. But,
if these ﬁrms act non-competitively on the homemarket, a correction of this externality is
in order.
One may also think of a situation with an upper bound z¯ on total pollution, imposed
by e.g., an international treaty. Hence the constraint to the optimization problem is z1 +∑n
i=1 zi2 ≤ z¯. If social welfare includes pollution damage and if the emission constraint
would not be binding in the optimum, adding the constraint is not interesting. So, we
assume that the ceiling is binding. In order to comply with the international norm, the
government may levy emission taxes τ1 and τ i2 (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) per unit of raw material
input in all sectors of the economy. It is easy to see that the setting does not change
the way the optimum can be implemented in a decentralized economy by means of
taxes. Alternatively, the government may install a system of tradable emissions permits.
Such a system is called uniform if trade is allowed among all domestic sectors, including
the sheltered sector. The system is differentiated if individual sectors have their own
system, with trade limited to those ﬁrms belonging to the individual sectors. Differential
environmental policy across sectors is not needed if the country is small on all world
markets, if its individual ﬁrms exploit their monopoly power, or if the government can
levy an export tax on “large” but competitive sectors. We will return to emission caps in
subsection 5.4.
3.4 Second-Best in the Large Country Case
We now assume that, due to international regulations, it is not feasible to use tar-
iffs as an instrument. It has been shown above that trade tariffs are not needed
to implement the ﬁrst-best optimum if there is perfect competition. Therefore, our
attention will be restricted to the large country case. In order to avoid the necessity
of correction of externalities on the domestic output markets, we will assume that
all individual ﬁrms are price takers, or that they do not supply to the home mar-
ket. The question addressed is again whether it is optimal to differentiate between
domestic sectors with respect to the emission taxes and whether taxes are below the
marginal damage or not.
Suppose the government has set Pigouvian emission taxes; they equalmarginal damage
(τ = D′/(∂U/∂c3)) and are uniform over the sectors. We ﬁrst investigate the question
how social welfare changes if the government marginally deviates from this policy, given
the market behavior of individual agents. For the case of individually price taking ﬁrms
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we have
dW = ∂U
∂c1
dc1 +
n∑
i=1
∂U
∂ci2
dci2 +
∂U
∂c3
dc3 − D′
[
dz1 +
n∑
i=1
dzi2
]
= ∂U
∂c3
[
p1dc1 +
n∑
i=1
pi2dc
i
2 + dc3 − τ
[
dz1 +
n∑
i=1
dzi2
]]
= ∂U
∂c3
[
p1
{
∂F1
∂k1
dk1 + ∂F1
∂z1
dz1
}
+
n∑
i=1
pi2
{
∂Fi2
∂ki2
dki2 +
∂Fi2
∂zi2
dzi2 −
dxi2( p
i
2)
dpi2
dpi2
}
+
n∑
i=1
{
xi2( p
i
2)dp
i
2 + pi2
dxi2( p
i
2)
dpi2
dpi2
}
− τ
[
dz1 +
n∑
i=1
dzi2
]]
= ∂U
∂c3
n∑
i=1
xi2( p
i
2)dp
i
2 =
∂U
∂c3
n∑
i=1
xi2( p
i
2)
dpi2
dτ
dτ.
For all sectors that behave as large sectors by themselveswe have dci2 = 0 and dpi2xi2( pi2) =
rdki2 + τdzi2. Hence
dW = ∂U
∂c3
∑
i
xi2( p
i
2)
∂pi2
∂τ
dτ,
where the summation is taken over the competitive sectors. It is welfare improving to
increase the emission tax for these competitive sectors since the higher tax will decrease
supply, thereby raising the price (see also Krutilla 1991). Therefore, the higher emis-
sion tax helps to reduce overall pollution. This result obviously also holds in case of
an exogenous upper bound on pollution. Marginally decreasing or increasing the tax
on emissions in the sheltered sector does not yield higher social welfare. To see this,
observe that in equilibrium p1 ∂F1∂z1 = τ1 from proﬁt maximization in the sheltered sector.
Moreover, ∂U
∂c1
= p1 U∂c3 . Therefore ∂U∂c1 ∂F1∂z1 = τ1 ∂U∂c3 . Consider a marginal variation of z1
only. In an optimum, this variation should not allow for a welfare improvement. Hence
d
dz1
[
U (c1, c2, c3) − D
(
z1 +
n∑
i=1
zi2
)]
= 0.
Stated otherwise
∂U
∂c1
∂F1
∂z1
= τ1 ∂U
∂c3
= D′.
In what follows we shall perform a global analysis of the problem. This allows for a
calculation of globally optimal environmental taxes, rather than calculating the effect of
a marginal deviation from taxes equal to marginal damage. Global welfare optimization
on the part of the government boils down to the maximization of utility minus damage,
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taking the constraints outlined above into account. We use the functional forms intro-
duced in subsection 3.1. World demand is isoelastic: x2( p2) = pε2 (ε < 0). It follows
from utility maximization subject to the budget constraint that
p1c1 = p2c2 = c3 = 13 [ p1F1 + p2F2]. (23)
Together with the conditions for market equilibrium, i.e., F1 = c1, F2 = c2 + x( p2),
this yields:
p1c1 = p2x( p2), c2 = x( p2), c3 = p2x( p2). (24)
It follows from proﬁt maximization that equilibrium prices are on the factor price fron-
tiers, corresponding with zero proﬁts, deﬁned by:
p1 =
( r
α
)α ( τ1
1 − α
)1−α
= f1(r, τ1), (25)
p2 =
(
r
β
)β (
τ2
1 − β
)1−β
= f2(r, τ2). (26)
Factor demands are:
k1(r, τ1, p1, p2) =
( r
α
)α−1 ( τ1
1 − α
)1−α
F1 =
( r
α
)α−1 ( τ1
1 − α
)1−α p2x( p2)
p1
, (27)
z1(r, τ1, p1, p2) =
( r
α
)α ( τ1
1 − α
)−α
F1 =
( r
α
)α ( τ1
1 − α
)−α p2x( p2)
p1
, (28)
k2(r, τ2, p2) =
(
r
β
)β−1 (
τ2
1 − β
)1−β
F2 =
(
r
β
)β−1 (
τ2
1 − β
)1−β
2x( p2), (29)
z2(r, τ2, p2) =
(
r
β
)β (
τ2
1 − β
)−β
F2 =
(
r
β
)β (
τ2
1 − β
)−β
2x( p2). (30)
Straightforward manipulations, using k1 + k2 = k, yield
k1 = αk
α + 2β , k1 =
2βk
α + 2β .
After substitution we have
W = ln kα1z1−α1 + ln
1
2
kβ2 z
1−β
2 + ln (
1
2
kβ2 z
1−β
2 )
1+1/ε − 1
2
[z1 + z2]2.
Maximization with respect to z1 and z2 gives
z1 = (1 − α)/
√
(1 − α) + (1 − β)(2 + 1/ε),
z2 = (1 − β)(2 + 1/ε)/
√
(1 − α) + (1 − β)(2 + 1/ε).
164 Withagen
Then, from the fact that
τ1z1
τ2z2
= (1 − α)p1F1
2(1 − β)p1F1 ,
it follows that
τ2 = 22 + 1/ετ1 > τ1.
So, for these speciﬁcations it is optimal to set the emissions tax higher for the exposed
sector than for the sheltered one, not only locally, but also globally.
The same result is obtained in case there is an exogenous upper bound on total
emissions. A tradable permits system should then be dual, allowing for a separate per-
mits market in each sector, yielding different permit prices for the two sectors. In an
unconstrained tradable permits system the exposed sector would demand more emission
permits and supply more to the world market than is optimal. In the case of more than
one export sector, multiple separate sectoral permits markets should be established. This
policy is generally more difﬁcult to implement, and it will be intricate to ensure perfect
competition as well. A policy design based on differentiated emissions taxes is therefore
likely to be more appropriate.
4 OLIGOPOLY; PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
4.1 Introduction
In this section, we start with a brief survey of the previous literature on oligopoly. The
analysis takes place within a partial equilibrium framework along the lines developed by
Conrad (1993), Kennedy (1994) and Barrett (1994). Then we develop and study a sim-
pliﬁed partial equilibrium model that serves as a benchmark for the general equilibrium
approach of the next section. A distinction will be made between Cournot and Bertrand.
The basic idea in all the contributions discussed here goes back to the Brander and
Spencer (1985) model where governments can take actions that constitute a commitment
of domestic ﬁrms toward their competitors. In a two-stage game interpretation the
government makes a strategic choice before the domestic ﬁrm takes an action with
regard to price setting. In the environmental policy literature both taxes and standards
predominantly act as a precommitment device for the government. A discussion of other
precommitment devices, like subsidies on R&D instrument, and their consequences can
be found in amongst others, Ulph (1996).
4.2 The Kennedy/Conrad/Barrett models
In this section, most attention is paid to Kennedy’s (1994) contribution because it
sketches the most general setting. Kennedy (1994) analyses a model that includes many
of the elements that play a crucial role in the remainder of this survey. It is a two-country
model, where each country has n identical ﬁrms, producing a homogeneous commodity.
Production of the representative ﬁrm in the home country is y, and it exports x. The
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inverse domestic demand function reads p(c) = p(ny− nx+ nxf ), where x f denotes the
exports of the representative foreign ﬁrm. The foreign domestic demand function reads
p(cf ) = p(ny f − nx f + nx). Marginal production costs are ϑ. Pollution is an inevitable
by-product of production. Emissions by the representative home ﬁrm are z = y/ϑ. The
parameter ϑ is chosen by each individual ﬁrm. Pollution damage in the home country is
D(z, zf ) = D(nz+χnzf ). This speciﬁcation allows for transboundary pollution: fraction
χ of foreign emissions is deposited in the home country, and vice versa. Emissions are
taxed at a rate τ. Proﬁts of the representative ﬁrm read
π(y, x,ϑ) = p(c)[ y − x] + p(cf )x − ϑy − τy/ϑ
with
c = y − x + (n − 1)[y¯ − x¯] + nxf ,
cf = n[ yf − xf ] + x + (n − 1)x¯,
where y¯ and x¯ denote output and net exports of each competing domestic ﬁrm, taken as
given. When determining optimal production, export and cost parameter, the ﬁrm also
takes foreign exports as given. The necessary conditions for an individual optimum read
∂π
∂y
= 0 : p′(c)[ y − x] + p(c) =
(
ϑ + τ
ϑ
)
, (31)
∂π
∂x
= 0 : −p′(c)[ y − x] − p(c) + p′(cf )x + p(cf ) = 0, (32)
∂π
∂ϑ
= 0 : ϑ = √τ. (33)
TheNash equilibrium is symmetric. All ﬁrms, be it domestic or foreign, are subject to the
same emission tax.Hence theywill choose the same abatement technology, and all outputs
are identical. Moreover, c = cf . It follows from (32) that x = 12y. Then we have
2np + cp′ = 4nt. (34)
The social optimum can be formulated as the outcome of the maximization of the sum
of each country’s consumer surplus, producer surplus and tax revenues, minus pollution
damage
W + Wf = U (c) − p(c)c + p(c)[ny − nx] + p(cf )nx − ϑny − τ ny
ϑ
+ τ ny
ϑ
−D
(
ny
ϑ
+ χny
f
ϑf
)
+ U (cf ) − p(cf )cf + p(cf )[nyf − nxf ] + p(c)nxf
−ϑf nyf − τf ny
f
ϑf
+ τf ny
f
ϑ
f
i
− D
(
nyf
ϑf
+ χny
ϑ
)
= 2
[
U (ny) − tny − D
(
(1 + χ)ny
t
)]
,
where it has been taken into account that the emission tax will be uniform over the
countries. Moreover, (33) has already been incorporated. A necessary condition for
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optimality is
[ p − t]∂ny
∂t
− ny = 1 + χ
t2
D′
[
t
∂ny
∂t
− ny
]
. (35)
If markets were perfectly competitive then ∂ny
∂t = 0 and τ = (1 + χ)D′ so that the
emission tax would equal marginal damage. By using (34) it can be shown that in the
case of oligopoly the optimal tax rate is smaller than marginal damage. Finally, Kennedy
studies the situation where the two governments play a Nash game against each other.2
A government sets its own tax rate, and takes the other government’s tax rate as well as
ﬁrms’ behavior as given. The reaction function for the home country is p + 12p′y = 2t.
In equilibrium, we have 2np + p′c = 2n(t + tf ), where f refers to the foreign country.
Each country is assumed to be able to calculate the change in the equilibrium upon a
change in its own tax rate, given that the other country’s tax rate remains unchanged. It
is argued that in the Nash equilibrium the emission tax is below the efﬁcient one given
by (31). Three elements play a role.
First, the so-called transboundary externality effect is responsible for a too low emis-
sion tax, at least if pollution is transboundary.
Second, a rent capture effect occurs. A unilateral decrease of the emission tax, starting
from the efﬁcient one, in one country will boost net exports, because it has a greater
impact on production than on domestic consumption. Also the rent capture effect calls
for lower environmental taxation.
The third effect is brought about by the pollution shifting. A decrease of the tax
rate will increase domestic production and thereby pollution. Obviously, the effect is
necessarily zero if pollution is purely transboundary. If it is only partly transboundary
then the effect is positive. Therefore, there would be an incentive to increase the local
taxes. It is formally shown by Kennedy that the second effect dominates the third one.
Hence the overall result is a tax rate below the efﬁcient one, in both countries.
Conrad (1993) studies a two-country world, within each country a single ﬁrm pro-
ducing a homogeneous commodity that is sold on a third market only. So, domestic
consumption is not taken into account. Pollution is purely global and uniformly mixing.
Each ﬁrm has the disposal of an abatement technology. Conrad shows that the pollution
tax rate in the Nash equilibrium is below the tax rate that would emerge under social
welfare maximization, taking into account the fact that pollution is transboundary. This
is what one would expect, since the model is less general than Kennedy’s. However,
Conrad also makes another contribution by considering other policy instruments such
as a subsidy on abatement activities. This subsidy, together with a high emission tax,
might be welfare improving, compared with the case where subsidies are absent. In any
case, abatement is enhanced.
Also Barrett (1994) is one of the forerunners on oligopoly and strategic environ-
mental policy. His model resembles Conrad’s in the sense that the two oligopolists in
two countries produce for a third market only. But in his model, a standard is the pol-
icy instrument and pollution is purely local. In the policy games played by the two
governments, emission standards are set below standards corresponding with marginal
2 The mathematics is not reproduced here.
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damage in the case of Cournot competition, and with standards higher than marginal
damage when competition is Bertrand. So, with Cournot competition policy is too lax,
and with Bertrand competition policy is too strict. When domestic output is produced
by multiple ﬁrms, these results do not necessarily hold anymore, and the standards might
be too lax or too stringent. We will return to the Barrett model in the sequel.
4.3 Partial Equilibrium Cournot Competition
We will argue in Section 5 that the policy recommendations following from a partial
equilibrium approach might drastically differ from those derived in a general equilib-
rium. This will be illustrated by means of an oligopoly model closely related to the ones
discussed in the previous subsection. To make the point we employ a model that in
some respects is simpler than those discussed above. We abstract from transboundary
pollution, and from the presence of an abatement technology. We also restrict ourselves
to a third market on which all production of the exposed sector is sold. There is no great
loss in looking at local pollution only. It should be clear from the previous subsection
what the effect of transboundary pollution is. Neglecting abatement is more serious. It
is assumed that there is a polluting input, so that in the case of standards this would just
mean an upper bound on the use of the production factor, whereas taxes have basically
the same effect. In this way, by not incorporating abatement as a potential activity to
which resources can be devoted, we reach a considerable simpliﬁcation, without loosing
the need for environmental policy. The absence of the home market is in the spirit of ear-
lier work by Conrad (1993) and Barrett (1994). In the present subsection, we introduce
the model with Cournot competition.
In the partial equilibrium approach the government takes as given all that occurs in
the domestic sheltered sector. The government is not interested in total social welfare
per se: e.g., pollution damage caused by the sheltered domestic sectors is not taken into
account. In this setting, social welfare can be written as
W =
n∑
i=1
{ p(x, xf )xi − τ izi} − D(z) +
n∑
i=1
τ izi .
Here p(x, xf ) = p(x1, x2, . . . , xn, xf ) = p(∑ni=1 (xi + xf )) is the world market price
of the (homogeneous) exported commodity, depending on output xi of sector i (i =
1, 2, . . . , n) and foreign supply xf . Emissions by sector i are zi , taxed at the rate τ i is the
emission tax. We have xi = Fi(zi). There is one foreign supplier of the exported com-
modity. Damage is D(z) = D(z1, z2, . . . , zn) = D(∑ni=1 zi). Hence, the government
seeks to maximize export revenues minus social costs, the latter consisting of capital
costs (which are exogenous) and the external damage costs caused by emissions of the
exporting sector. All emission tax revenues
∑n
i=1 τ izi are recycled to the consumer.
In Barrett’s Nash game each government takes output of domestic ﬁrms as given. In
such circumstances the socially optimal standard arises from the equality of marginal
abatement costs and marginal damage. Implementation of this rule requires information
about the abatement cost function. In our model, with taxes and in the absence of
abatement, an analogous approach would be to assume that the government knows the
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cost function or the production function, from which demand for the raw material (and
hence emissions) can be derived. Proﬁt maximization on the part of ﬁrm i implies
{ p + p′xi}∂F
i
∂zi
= τ i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (36)
We ﬁrst perform a local analysis, starting from a situation where the government sets the
emission tax equal to marginal damage: τ i = D′. From dxi = ∂Fi
∂zi dz
i and (36) we have
τ idzi = [ p + p′xi]dxi . Hence
dW =
n∑
i=1
[xidp + pdxi] − D′(z)
n∑
i=1
dzi ,
= x1p′
{ n∑
i=1
dxi + dxf
}
+ pdx1 − D′dz1 + x2p′
{ n∑
i=1
dxi + dxf
}
+ pdx2 − D′dz2 + · · · + xnp′
{ n∑
i=1
dxi + dxf
}
+ pdxn − D′dzn,
= x1p′{dx2 + dx3 + · · · + dxn} + x2p′{dx1 + dx3 + · · · + dxn}
+ · · · + xnp′{dx1 + dx2 + · · · + dxn−1} +
n∑
i=1
xip′dxf ,
=
( n∑
i=1
xi − x1
)
p′dx1 +
( n∑
i=1
xi − x2
)
p′dx2 + · · · +
( n∑
i=1
xi − xn
)
p′dxn
+
( n∑
i=1
xi
)
p′dxf .
For identical domestic ﬁrms we have dW = n(n − 1)x˜p′dx˜ + nx˜p′dxf , where x˜ is supply
of the representative domestic producer. So, if dxf is assumed to be zero, it is optimal to
increase the tax in order to decrease supply and enhance social welfare.
Assume there is one domestic producer. Then
dW = xp′dxf = xp′ dx
dτ
dxf
dx
dτ. (37)
If the policy maker assumes that a change in its policy does not affect foreign supply
(dxf = 0), it is optimal to keep the tax at the so-called environmentally optimal level. In
the right-hand side of (37) several factors appear. Clearly x > 0 and p′ < 0. Moreover,
dx/dτ < 0 since the reaction curve of the domestic ﬁrm shifts outward as the tax rate
decreases (this is a consequence of the second order condition for the maximization of
proﬁts by the domestic ﬁrm). If the Nash equilibrium on the product market is stable,
International Trade and Environmental Policy Under Imperfect Competition 169
and if the policy maker takes into account that the outward shift of the domestic reaction
curve leads to an equilibrium with smaller foreign supply, the policy maker sets the
emission tax below marginal damage.
With multiple domestic producers (n > 1) it might be optimal to have higher emission
taxes, because two types of impacts can be distinguished due to a decrease in the emission
tax rate. On the one hand, production increases, thereby enhancing proﬁts from exports
on the world market due to the fact that foreign equilibrium supply decreases, as before.
On the other hand, the increase of supply by the domestic ﬁrms may decrease their
proﬁtability on the world market. The total effect is therefore ambiguous. Barrett (1994)
and Ulph (1997), who employ a somewhat different model, ﬁnd the same result.
In order to illustrate the results obtained above we return to the example of a Cobb–
Douglas technology and a quadratic damage function of subsection 3.1 in the previ-
ous section, with a linear demand function. There is only a single domestic producer.
Demand for the raw material is
z =
(
r
β
)β (
τ
1 − β
)−β
x,
where r is to be considered ﬁxed. Without strategic behavior on the part of the govern-
ment the emission tax rate equals marginal damage: τ = D′(z) = z. Combining the two
equations, we get a relationship between the emission tax and output:
τ =
(
r
β
) β
1+β ( 1
1 − β
) −β
1+β
x
1
1+β .
Paraphrasing Barrett, this schedule can be called the environmentally optimal emission tax.
For each given tax rate the exporting ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts with respect to the
raw material, yielding
1 − 2ax − axf =
(
τ
1 − β
)1−β ( r
β
)β
.
Note that the reaction curve is downward sloping for all tax rates. The next question is
what happens when the government decreases the emission tax, starting from the “envi-
ronmentally optimal” one deﬁned above. Clearly, given the foreign country’s output, the
domestic ﬁrm’s reaction curve shifts outward and the new equilibriumhas higher domes-
tic production and less foreign production, assuming a stable Nash equilibrium on the
output market. What is the implication for social welfare? According to (37) we have
dW
dτ
= −axdx
f
dx
dx
dτ
.
Taking into account that
dx
dτ
< 0 and
dxf
dx
< 0,
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we conclude that it is indeed optimal for the government to set an emission tax lower
than the environmentally optimal one. This is not only true under the assumption that
the foreign government does not react strategically, but the conclusion holds as well if
the foreign government does react strategically.
4.4 Partial Equilibrium Bertrand Competition
Next we consider Bertrand oligopoly on the world markets. We maintain the assumption
that there is only one foreign competitor, charging a price pf . Social welfare reads
W =
n∑
i=1
{ pixi( p, pf ) − τ izi} − D(z) +
n∑
i=1
τ izi ,
where p = ( p1, p2, . . . , pn) is the vector of prices charged by the domestic ﬁrms, and
xi = Fi(zi). Firm i maximizes proﬁts, piFi(zi)−τ izi , subject to Fi(zi) = xi( p, pf ). This
yields {
pi + xi 1
∂xi/∂pi
}
∂Fi
∂zi
= τ i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (38)
Taking into account proﬁt maximization,Fi(zi) = xi( p, pf ) and τ i = D′(z) the variation
in social welfare is
dW =
n∑
i=1
{xidpi + pidxi} − D′(z)
n∑
i=1
dzi
=
n∑
i=1
{
xidpi + pi ∂F
i
∂zi
dzi − D′dzi
}
=

x1 −
n∑
j=1
x1
∂xj/∂p1
∂xj/∂pj

 dp1 +

x2 −
n∑
j=1
x2
∂xj/∂p2
∂xj/∂pj

 dp2
+ · · · +

xn −
n∑
j=1
xn
∂xj/∂pn
∂xj/∂pj

 dpn −
n∑
j=1
xj
∂xj/∂pf
∂xj/∂pj
dpf .
As in the case of Cournot competition the result is ambiguous if there is more than one
domestic supplier. Therefore, we assume that n = 1. Then
dW = −x dp
dpf
dpf
dτ
dτ.
The best reply function of the domestic country is increasing: for a ﬁxed emission tax
the optimal price increases as the foreign price is increased. Moreover, in a stable market
equilibrium, an increase in the tax rate will cause a downward shift in the domestic reply
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function and hence decrease the equilibrium prices. So, an increase in taxes, starting
from taxes equal tomarginal damage, will increase social welfare. Henceforth the optimal
taxation is larger thanmarginal damage. So, the usual outcome that Cournot competition
and Bertrand competition lead to different policy conclusions is reached here as well.
We end this section with an illustration. With linear demand and a Cobb–Douglas
technology, proﬁt maximization entails:
1 − 2ap + apf = a
(
τ
1 − β
)1−β ( r
β
)β
.
The domestic reaction function is upward sloping in the price charged by the foreign
competitor. Moreover, an increase of the emission tax will cause a downward shift of the
reaction curve. Hence, given the foreign reaction curve, it is optimal to set an emission
tax higher than marginal damage.
5 OLIGOPOLY; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
5.1 Introduction
The previous section addressed the question whether governments have an incentive
to deviate from the Pigouvian environmental tax rule in the case of an oligopoly, in the
context of a partial equilibrium model. In the absence of a home market and with a single
supplier per country the answer is in the afﬁrmative. Moreover, in these circumstances
the emissions tax is too low in the case of Cournot competition on the world market,
whereas the reverse holds for Bertrand competition. If there are multiple domestic ﬁrms
these results do not generally hold anymore. Kennedy provides an example where the
tax is still below the Pigouvian one in a coordinated optimum and even lower in the Nash
game played between the two governments.
In the present section, we revisit the question posed in a general equilibrium set-
ting, keeping as much as possible the spirit of the models studied above. As before
we abstract from domestic consumption of the exported commodity. There is a sin-
gle competitor on the world market. And we do not allow for abatement. The main
modiﬁcation is that the economy now has two sectors, both using a polluting input as
well as capital, assumed mobile across sectors, but immobile between countries. The
motivation for analyzing oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting is that the strat-
egy of increasing domestic production by relaxing emission standards has an effect
on the allocation of capital in the economy through the rate of return. In partic-
ular, by making the polluting input less expensive also the sheltered sector might
be stimulated. This effect is neglected in a partial equilibrium setting. It will be
shown below that the effect can be important and may imply policy recommenda-
tions opposite to the ones obtained for the partial equilibrium discussed in the pre-
vious section. In the next subsection 5.2 we consider Cournot competition, Bertrand
is dealt with in subsection 5.3. Finally, in 5.4 we consider the case of an emission
ceiling.
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5.2 General Equilibrium: Cournot Competition
The aim of this section is ﬁrst to derive and characterize the social optimum for the
home economy if the supply by the foreign ﬁrm is taken as given. It is shown that a
uniform emission tax cannot implement this allocation. The underlying idea is simple.
In the economy there are two distortions: one is the environmental distortion and the
second is the fact that the world market is non-competitive. The latter distortion is fully
exploited if there were a single domestic ﬁrm acting as an oligopolist on theworldmarket.
Here the absence of a domestic market is crucial of course. The former distortion can be
solved independently, using uniform emission taxes equal to marginal damage. If there
are multiple domestic ﬁrms the latter distortion is not fully internalized. The formal
proof of this is quite similar to the exercises performed before. It is given for the sake of
completeness. The ﬁrst-best optimum is the solution of maximizing social welfare
W = U (c1, c3) − D
(
z1 +
n∑
i=1
zi2
)
subject to
c1 = F1(k1, z1), (39)
c3 =
n∑
i=1
p2(x2, x
f
2 )x
i
2 =
n∑
i=1
p2

 n∑
j=1
xj2 + xf2

 xi2, (40)
xi2 = Fi2(ki2, zi2), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (41)
k1 +
n∑
i=1
ki2 = k. (42)
So, the exposed sector only exports. The export revenues are used for the import of a
third commodity. The world market price of the exported commodity is p2 and depends
on supply from the home country x2 = (x12, x22, . . . , xn2) and foreign supply xf2 . The
Lagrangian reads
L = U (c1, c3) − D
(
z1 +
n∑
i=1
zi2
)
+ µ1[F1(k1, z1) − c1] +
n∑
i=1
µi2[Fi2(ki2, zi2) − xi2]
+µ3

 n∑
i=1
p2

 n∑
j=1
xj2 + xf2

 xi2 − c3

+ r¯
[
k − k1 −
n∑
i=1
ki2
]
.
The necessary conditions are
∂U
∂c1
= µ1, ∂U
∂c3
= µ3, (43)
µ1
∂F1
∂k1
= r¯; µ1 ∂F1
∂z1
= D′, (44)
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µi2
∂Fi2
∂ki2
= r¯; µi2
∂Fi2
∂zi2
= D′, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (45)
µ3
[
p′2
n∑
i=1
xi2 + p2
]
= µi2, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (46)
The multipliers µ1,µ3 and r¯ correspond to the two consumer commodities and capital,
respectively.
Suppose that the emission tax rate is uniformly set equal to marginal damage: τ =
D′/µ3. Deﬁne p1 = µ1/µ3, p3 = 1, r = r¯/µ3. It follows from utility maximization
that ∂U/∂c1 = p1∂U∂c3. Proﬁt maximization on the part of exporting ﬁrm i implies
{xi2p′2 + p2} ∂F
i
2
∂ki2
= r, {xi2p′2 + p2} ∂F
i
2
∂zi2
= τ. Starting from undifferentiated emission taxes
we then have
dW = ∂U
∂c3
p′2
[( n∑
i=1
xi2 − x12
)
dx12 +
( n∑
i=1
xi2 − x22
)
dx22
+ · · · +
( n∑
i=1
xi2 − xn2
)
dxn2 +
( n∑
i=1
xi2
)
dxf2
]
.
With identical domestic producers, each supplying x˜2 the expression for the marginal
change in welfare boils down to
dW = ∂U
∂c3
p′2nx˜2[(n − 1)dx˜2 + dxf2 ].
Therefore, even in this case a uniform tax rate is not sufﬁcient to implement the optimum.
An increase in the tax rate, still taking xf2 ﬁxed will increase social welfare because it
decreases domestic supply on the world market. So, we consider the case of a single
domestic supplier from here on.
Obviously the impact of a deviation of a tax rate from the initial state is zero if
the policy maker takes foreign supply as given. The more interesting case arises if the
domestic ﬁrm can be made to supply as a Stackelberg leader. This is achieved through
the government’s tax policy. In order to perform the analysis we assume that the home
country is the Stackelberg leader and the other country is the follower. In the game, there
are essentially four players, the two oligopolistic ﬁrms and the two governments. The
individual ﬁrms are Nash players on the world product market. In the Cournot setting
they take their rival’s supply as given. One way to model the game at the level of the
governments is to assume that the foreign government, the follower, takes the tax rates
set by the home government as given, and maximizes its own welfare given these taxes.
However, this complicates matters for the following reason. The tax structure in the
home country does not completely determine the home country’s supply on the world
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market, because supply is also affected by the supply of the foreign ﬁrm, which is subject
to taxation in the foreign country. Therefore, with this setup the foreign country can
still have a considerable indirect effect. In addition large difﬁculties turn out to arise if
one then wants to actually calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium. In order to overcome
this complication, we assume that the foreign government only observes world market
supply by the home ﬁrm (x2), takes this as given, and subsequently determines its own
optimal tax structure. As a result, for any given x2 the foreign government sets uniform
emissions taxes that maximize social welfare. These taxes then also generate foreign
supply. Subsequently, the home government takes the overall reaction function of the
foreign country into account in determining its own optimal taxes.
The ﬁrst step to be taken then is to derive the other country’s reaction function and
to incorporate it into the objective function of the leader. Since it is the main purpose
of this exercise to show that the general equilibrium result may essentially differ from
the result obtained for the partial equilibrium model we restrict ourselves to an example.
It is assumed that the countries are identical, in terms of technologies and preferences.
They may differ with respect to capital endowment. We employ the speciﬁcations of
Section 3with an isoelastic world demand function.National income equals p1F1+p2F2.
In view of the utility functions and in the absence of domestic consumption of the
exported commodity, it follows from utility maximization on the part of the consumers
that: p1c1 = 12 [ p1F1 + p2F2] and p1c1 = 12 [ p1F1 + p2F2]. Equilibrium on the current
account implies c3 = p2F2 = p2x2. Hence p1c1 = p2F2 = p2x2. Proﬁt maximization in
the sheltered sector requires that the equilibrium prices are on the factor price frontier.
Proﬁt maximization on the part of the exporting sector implies
(x2 + xf2 )1/ε
[
1 + x2
ε[x2 + xf2 ]
]
=
(
r
β
)β (
τ2
1 − β
)1−β
= f2(r, τ2).
The capital and raw material inputs are given by (20)–(23). The mathematical problem
faced by the government can be stated as the maximization of
ln p2(x2 + xf2 )x2/p1 + ln p2(x2 + xf2 )x −
1
2
[z1 + z2]2
subject to the conditions mentioned above. Also the foreign country solves this problem,
thereby taking home country’s supply as given. Therefore, it will not apply differential
emission taxation. Welfare optimization of the foreign country then yields its world
market supply as a function of supply by the home country. Unfortunately, the foreign
country’s problem cannot be solved in such a way that the sensitivity with respect to
home supply can be determined analytically, as one would wish to do in order to ﬁnd
out how to set optimal taxes in different circumstances. For that reason, we report on
a number of numerical calculations made in Elbers and Withagen (2002a and 2003). In
subsection 5.4,wherewe dealwith a general equilibriumwith an oligopoly and exogenous
emission constraint, we will be able to say more about this in an analytical way.
In the calculations we discuss here, the capital endowment of the home country is 10,
for the foreign country it is 5. The price elasticity of world demand is –2. The production
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elasticity of capital in the sheltered sector is 0.965 for both countries and 0.8 in the export
sector, corresponding with energy shares of 3.5% and 20%, respectively, as is the case in
the Netherlands. With these numerical values it is found that the domestic tax rates in
the Stackelberg equilibrium equal 0.49 and 0.50 in the sheltered and the exposed sector,
respectively. Subsequently numerous sensitivity analyses were performed, with regard to
price elasticity, production elasticity and capital endowment, all suggesting that a more
strict treatment of the exporting sector is in order. The intuition behind this result is
that if the sheltered sector would be treated in a more lenient way, it would demand more
capital, at the expense of the sheltered sector. This additional demand and production
would not sufﬁciently be compensated by more exports, at the expense of the foreign
country.
5.3 General Equilibrium: Bertrand Competition
In this section, we analyze general equilibrium with price competition. The social opti-
mum is the solution of the following optimization problem: maximize
W = U (c1, c3) − D
(
z1 +
n∑
i=1
zi2
)
subject to (39), (40), (42) and
c3 =
n∑
i=1
pi2x
i
2( p2, p
f ) (47)
with p2 = ( p12, p22, . . . , pn2). Necessary conditions for a social optimum are (43)–(46) and
µ3xi2( p
i
2, p
f
2 ) +
n∑
j=1
(µ3p
j
2 − µj2)
∂xj2( p2, p
f
2 )
∂pi2
= 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (48)
Suppose that the emission tax rate is uniformly set equal to marginal damage: τ =
D′/µ3. Deﬁne p1 = µ1/µ3, p3 = 1, r = r¯/µ3. It follows from utility maximization
that ∂U/∂c1 = p1∂U/∂c3. Proﬁt maximization on the part of exporting ﬁrm i implies
{xi2+pi2 ∂x
i
2
∂pi2
} ∂Fi2
∂ki2
= r ∂xi2
∂pi2
, {xi2+pi2 ∂x
i
2
∂pi2
} ∂Fi2
∂zi2
= τ ∂xi2
∂pi2
. Starting fromundifferentiated emission
taxes we then have, after straightforward but tedious calculations
dW = ∂U
∂c3



x12 −
n∑
j=1
xj2
∂xj2/∂p
1
2
∂xj2/∂p
j
2

 dp12 +

x22 −
n∑
j=1
xj2
∂xj2/∂p
2
2
∂xj2/∂p
j
2

 dp22
+ · · · +

xn2 −
n∑
j=1
xj2
∂xj2/∂p
n
2
∂xj2/∂p
j
2

 dpn2 −


n∑
j=1
xj2
∂xj2/∂p
f
2
∂xj2/∂p
j
2

 dpf2

 .
176 Withagen
For n = 1 this expression boils down to
dW = −∂U
∂c3
x2
∂x2/∂p
f
2
∂x2/∂p2
dpf .
Therefore, if the policy maker takes the foreign price as given the impact of a deviation
of a tax rate from marginal damage is zero: with only one domestic supplier it is optimal
from a social welfare point of view to have all emission taxes equal to marginal damage.
Hence there is no reason to discriminate against speciﬁc sectors or to favor sectors.
Again, the more interesting case is where the domestic ﬁrms can be made to act as
von Stackelberg leaders. A numerical analysis with the home country as the leader and
the foreign country as the follower has been performed in Elbers and Withagen (2002b).
For α = 0.4, β = 0.2, k = kf = 10, x2( p2, pf2 ) = 1− 0.2p2 + 0.4pf2 it is found that with
the home country as the leader it will set τ1 = 3.93, which equals marginal damage, and
τ2 = 1.84. For a large set of alternative parameter values it is found that the optimal
policy entails lower emission taxes for the exposed sector than for the sheltered one.
5.4 General EquilibriumWith Emission Constraints
Finally, we reconsider the case of Cournot oligopoly but with an exogenous emission
constraint. Recently this case was extensively studied by Mulatu et al. (2006). This is
an interesting case with regard to the emission constraints imposed by e.g. the Kyoto
protocol. The question to be addressed is whether in the case of such an emission ceiling
it is advantageous from a social welfare point of view to install different permit trading
systems for the different sectors of the economy or to impose different emission taxes.
The analysis is restricted to a single domestic producer (n = 1) of the exportable acting
as a duopolist on the world market. As before, the exported commodity is not consumed
domestically. With z¯ as the upper bound on emissions the emission constraint reads
z1 + z2 = z¯. (49)
Totally differentiating the home country’s welfare function, yields:
dU = ∂U
∂c3
[τ1dz1 + τ2dz2 + x2p′dxf2 ].
Hence, if the home country takes foreign supply as given (dxf = 0), then it is optimal
to set equal emissions taxes or to install a uniform system of tradable emissions permits,
since then τ1dz1 + τ2dz2 = τ[dz1 + dz2] = 0.
However, matters change if by manipulating the domestic emissions tax rates foreign
supply can be affected. In that case, starting fromequal taxes, a policy that reduces foreign
supply is beneﬁcial. Therefore, we assume that the foreign country is a Stackelberg
follower, and the home country is the Stackelberg leader. For the outcome of the game,
the slope of the foreign reaction function is crucial. On the one hand, if the foreign
reaction function is upward sloping, then, starting from a situation of undifferentiated
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emission taxes, the home government wants to decrease its own supply to the world
market, for that would increase welfare. The welfare improvement can be accomplished
by increasing the tax rate applied to the exposed sector. On the other hand, if the foreign
reaction function is downward sloping, a decrease of the tax rate imposed on the exposed
sector is in order. The issue is again closely related to the strategic trade policy literature
(see Brander and Spencer 1985, and Helpman and Krugman 1985). In two papers,
Collie and De Meza (1986 and 2003) address the question whether the outputs of the
oligopolists are strategic complements or strategic substitutes in a partial equilibrium
model, but not in the context of a general equilibrium environmental policy setting. They
show that with a demand function exhibiting a constant price elasticity, the reaction
functions in a Nash equilibrium are downward sloping if and only if demand is elastic.
However, in our general equilibrium setting the sign may be reversed.
The foreign country takes supply by the home country as given. Therefore it imposes
a uniform emissions tax. The system of general equilibrium conditions for the foreign
country is given by the following set of equations (explicit reference to foreign is omitted,
when there is no danger of confusion):
z1
k1
= r
α
1 − α
τ
, (50)
z2
k2
= r
β
1 − β
τ
, (51)
p1 =
( r
α
)α ( τ
1 − α
)1−α
, (52)
p2 = (x2 + xf2 )1/ε, (53)(
x2 + xf2
)1/ε [
1 + x
f
2
ε[x2 + xf2 ]
]
=
(
r
β
)β (
τ
1 − β
)1−β
, (54)
z1 + z2 = z¯, (55)
k1 + k2 = k, (56)
p1kα1z
1−α
1 = p2xf2 , (57)
xf2 = kβ2 z1−β2 . (58)
Equations (50) and (51) follow from cost minimization, and Eq. (52) follows from perfect
competition in the sheltered sector. Equation (53) is world demand. Equation (54) follows
from proﬁt maximization of the exposed sector. Equations (55) and (56) are evident.
Equation (57) follows from utility maximization and equilibrium on the current account:
p1c1 = p1F1 = c3 = p2x2. Finally, (58) is the production function of the exposed sector.
The system is solved in Mulatu et al. (2006), who also show that the foreign reaction
function is upward sloping. So, if the home country acts as a Stackelberg leader it will set
τ2 ≥ τ1. Hence, we obtain the important insight that for the class of speciﬁcations under
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consideration, the exposed sector needs to be taxed more heavily than the sheltered
sector if the home country is a Stackelberg leader. Optimality of this policy has not been
assessed for other classes than the one considered here. However, the relevance of the
result is that it runs counter to what is commonly advocated in policy circles. Moreover,
the exercise supports our conjecture that the earlier result for the Cournot and Bertrand
model are more general than for the speciﬁc parameters employed.
In view of political economy aspects such as rent seeking and lobbying, which may
prevent the feasibility of the new tax policy, Mulatu et al. (2006) analyze the effect of the
proposed policy on the proﬁtability of the exposed sector. The unit cost function of the
exposed sector reads
c2(r, τ2) =
(
r
β
)β (
τ2
1 − β
)1−β
.
Proﬁt maximization boils down to the maximization of

2(x2) = p(x2 + xf2 )x2 − c(r, τ2)x2
with foreign supply given. With the isoelastic demand function (53) we have

2(x2) = x
2
2
−ε[x2 + xf2 ]1−1/ε
= x
1+1/ε1+1/ε
2
−ε
[
1 + x
f
2
x2
]1−1/ε .
Therefore, in comparing the Nash and the Stackelberg tax regimes, it is clear that
proﬁtability is enhanced if domestic output increases or if foreign supply decreases
relative to home supply. Indeed, supply of the traded commodity by the home
country may increase compared to the Nash equilibrium. Obviously, this is not
the case when the two equilibria are close to each other, because the Stackelberg
leader should then increase the emission tax on the exposed sector even in abso-
lute terms. However, when the economies differ considerably, it need no longer
be the case that the Nash equilibrium tax rate is between the two Stackelberg
tax rates. In Mulatu et al. this result is illustrated by means of a set of simu-
lation runs. As expected, when the economies are similar with regard to initial
capital it is found that the Nash equilibrium tax rate is between the Stackelberg
tax rates for the sheltered and exposed sectors. Moreover, the sheltered sector suf-
fers from the new tax regime in terms of proﬁtability. However, with an increas-
ing difference in capital endowment the exposed sector beneﬁts more from the
higher tax rate. Although the exposed sector pays more than the sheltered sector,
the tax rate is considerably less than in the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, being a
Stackelberg leader is not only welfare enhancing at the country level, but it also
increases proﬁtability in the sector that is subject to the more stringent environ-
mental policy. However, the proﬁt differential is positive when the foreign coun-
try is relatively well endowed, both with capital and allowable emissions. In such
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circumstances it is rather more difﬁcult to justify home’s Stackelberg leadership,
at least within the present model.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper addresses several issues regarding international trade and environmental
policy. We have reviewed the theory on the pollution haven hypothesis and highlighted
some recent developments in the analysis of imperfect competition and strategic policy
making. The survey shows that care should be taken with the framework in which
the question of policy differentials is analyzed. The outcomes obtained in a general
equilibrium approachmight qualitatively drastically differ fromwhat is found in a partial
equilibrium setting.
These theoretical results have important implications for the policy debates on glob-
alization and the environment, and the issue of harmonization of environmental policies
across countries. The results relieve the frequently debated tension between trade and
environmental policy objectives by suggesting that fear of ecological dumping can hardly
be substantiated by means of standard neoclassical theory. Obviously, in the real world,
matters are more complicated than we can currently capture in theoretical microeco-
nomic models. Speciﬁcally, the assumption of governments behaving as strict social-
welfare maximizing agents aiming to design and implement environmental policies in
a socially optimal fashion is open to discussion and can be modiﬁed. It is nowadays
customary to think of governments as policy brokers bringing together different interest
groups with conﬂicting stakes in policy outcomes. Strictly speaking, one could therefore
maybe rule out the possibility that policies of ecological dumping can be justiﬁed on
the basis of utilitarian optimality grounds. But social optimality may not necessarily be
the basis for policy-making. However, it is equally implausible to expect the game of
interest groups competing for policy inﬂuence to end up by necessity in a situation where
proponents of eco-dumping will unequivocally dominate the game.
A problematic aspect of our approach concerns the information the Stackelberg leader
needs to design its optimal policy. This calls for further research. Similarly, we assume
that the supply of the polluting raw material is inelastic and sufﬁciently high. It may
very well be worthwhile, although technically much more difﬁcult, to allow for imports
of this commodity at positive world market prices. Overall, our results suggest the
prevalence of a strong link between the design of international environmental agreements
and the design of policies with respect to the environment and trade. A closer future
investigation of this link would be worthwhile, both from a theoretical as well as a
policy perspective. An important outcome of the analysis is the desirability of uniform
emission taxes in many circumstances. However, it should be kept in mind that this is
in part due to the speciﬁc damage functions employed, where damage only depends on
aggregate emissions. It would be interesting to see how this conclusion changes when
this is no longer the case, for example when location matters. Finally, it would be very
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worthwhile to incorporate imperfect competition and strategic government behavior in
the Copeland-Taylor model, in order to say more on the resulting trade patterns.
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